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The Use of Research Evidence in Instructional Improvement
Abstract
Those who seek to reform our public schools often argue that school performance would improve if only
policy and practice were based on evidence. If decision-makers and practitioners paid more attention to
research findings, the argument goes, they would make better decisions about improvement strategies and
resource allocation, and we would see better results. The belief in this axiom is demonstrated by the increasing
frequency with which reformers, educators, and policymakers find it necessary to legitimate their actions with
claims that they are "research-based." However, moving beyond rhetoric to actually put this principle into
operation turns out to be difficult.
This issue of CPRE Policy Briefs looks at findings from the Consortium for Policy Research in Education's
study of how central office and school staff in three urban districts made decisions about instructional
improvement strategies, and how much weight they gave to evidence. The three districts, in three different
states, had enrollments ranging from 50,000 to over 200,000. Leaders in all three districts were addressing the
problems common to most urban districts: students' problems associated with living in poverty, low
achievement, high mobility, and high dropout rates. Changes in district and school leadership, high teacher
turnover, changes in funding, and new state policies compounded the difficulty of improving performance in
all three sites. The districts were also working in environments characterized by decentralized decision-
making, high-stakes accountability, and increasing competition among providers of comprehensive school
reform designs and other "research-based" instructional improvement strategies.
During our study, we looked at three sets of strategic decisions that each district faced as it tried to improve
student performance. The first set of decisions concerned what to do (i.e., which reform design or curriculum
to adopt). The next set was deciding how to get it done; how to provide adequate support and coordination;
and how to focus people's attention on the desired changes, ensure effective implementation, reduce
distractions, and buffer this important work from competing agendas. Finally, there were decisions about
scaling up the reforms -- the problem of replication. The decision-making process in each case was
complicated and the use of evidence to support the ultimate decisions varied considerably. While these
categories overlap, they are useful organizers of our findings.
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School district leaders want to make evidence-
based decisions and they are making efforts to
build evidence-based cultures in their central
offices and schools. But, significant progress is
being hampered by the inadequacy and confusion
of the existing research, its availability to school
and district-level staff, and a reliance by staff on
decision-making patterns that focus on philoso-
phy rather than effects. 
Introduction
Those who seek to reform our public
schools often argue that school performance
would improve if only policy and practice
were based on evidence. If decision-makers
and practitioners paid more attention to
research findings, the argument goes, they
would make better decisions about improve-
ment strategies and resource allocation, and
we would see better results. The belief in this
axiom is demonstrated by the increasing fre-
quency with which reformers, educators, and
policymakers find it necessary to legitimate
their actions with claims that they are
“research-based.” However, moving beyond
rhetoric to actually put this principle into
operation turns out to be difficult.
This issue of CPRE Policy Briefs looks at
findings from the Consortium for Policy
Research in Education’s study of how central
office and school staff in three urban districts
made decisions about instructional improve-
ment strategies, and how much weight they
gave to evidence. The three districts, in three
different states, had enrollments ranging
from 50,000 to over 200,000. Leaders in all
three districts were addressing the problems
common to most urban districts: students’
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problems associated with living in poverty,
low achievement, high mobility, and high
dropout rates. Changes in district and school
leadership, high teacher turnover, changes in
funding, and new state policies compounded
the difficulty of improving performance in all
three sites. The districts were also working in
environments characterized by decentralized
decision-making, high-stakes accountability,
and increasing competition among providers
of comprehensive school reform designs and
other “research-based” instructional
improvement strategies. 
During our study, we looked at three sets
of strategic decisions that each district faced
as it tried to improve student performance.
The first set of decisions concerned what to
do (i.e., which reform design or curriculum to
adopt). The next set was deciding how to get
it done; how to provide adequate support
and coordination; and how to focus people’s
attention on the desired changes, ensure
effective implementation, reduce distrac-
tions, and buffer this important work from
competing agendas. Finally, there were deci-
sions about scaling up the reforms — the
problem of replication. The decision-making
process in each case was complicated and the
use of evidence to support the ultimate deci-
sions varied considerably. While these cate-
gories overlap, they are useful organizers of
our findings.
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2Decision One: What to Do and
How to Begin?
Use of Evidence
In these highly decentralized systems,
central office staff in all three districts faced
the challenge of deciding what their role
should be in the design selection process. All
three staffs wanted to ensure that school
staffs made decisions about improvement
strategies based on evidence that they were
effective and adopted reforms that were con-
sidered “best practice.” However, finding
ways to help schools use evidence-based
decision-making proved to be difficult in all
three situations.  
One district set up a screening process
that examined the alignment between local
and state standards and whole-school
designs with externally developed curricula
and then reviewed the evidence supporting
the claims of the developers. Schools could
then choose from designs that had been
approved by this district-wide committee.
This process worked reasonably well for
deciding which comprehensive school
reform designs to adopt. The district commit-
tee narrowed the range of choices to a hand-
ful of designs and ruled out others whose
programs were judged to be poorly aligned
with state assessments. But this critical
review of evidence was not extended to other
reform initiatives or to investments in profes-
sional development.
A second district created an office dedi-
cated to the review of evidence and planned
to prepare and disseminate summaries of the
research evidence on various school designs
and curriculum programs so school staff
could make more informed choices. But a
central office staff committee created to guide
this work became bogged down in ideologi-
cal debates over what constituted evidence
and whether specific programs should be
included or excluded from the information
base. When the available evidence did not
correspond to their preferences, advocates of
particular strategies attacked the quality of
the evidence. A frequent argument heard was
that standardized test scores were not an ade-
quate measure of a program’s effectiveness.
There was confusion about what it meant to
be research-based — was a program
research-based if research findings were used
to determine its components or was evidence
of effects necessary? The committee strug-
gled over “rules of evidence.” Was evidence
of effects in one school compelling?
In the third district, a committee of facul-
ty from local higher education institutions
and district staff was formed to screen
designs and programs that would be permit-
ted to enter the district, but the committee
ultimately perceived their screening role as
too prescriptive. They were reluctant to
exclude any design or program on the
grounds of inadequate evidence of its effec-
tiveness because how one interpreted the
available evidence was a matter of personal
philosophy and perspective. They did not
believe that decision rules could be devel-
oped that would be accepted by all parties.
The committee shifted its focus from review-
ing designs and programs to discussing part-
nerships among institutions. 
In the end, patterns of decision-making
based on philosophical commitments, politi-
cal necessities, and the attractiveness or pop-
ularity of ideas prevailed over efforts to
attend to evidence in all three districts. The
emergence of evidence-based decision-mak-
ing was hampered by professional cultures in
which the “good” and the “popular” were
valued more than the effective, and in which
the lack of external sources of professional
legitimacy meant that personal beliefs about
policy and practice usually prevailed over
evidence. But the effort to shift the focus to
evidence was also hampered by difficulties
accessing and making sense of the research
evidence. An inadequate knowledge base,
the lack of research synthesis, difficulty
accessing the most recent research findings,
and the ideological orientations of the
researchers and consultants who were con-
tacted all made it difficult for local decision-
makers to attend to the evidence.
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3As a consequence, efforts to develop new
procedures for review of evidence and to pro-
vide guidance to school staffs about “best
practice” failed in two of the districts and
were only partially successful in the third.
Nevertheless, these efforts were important.
They demonstrated a genuine desire on the
part of district leaders to link their decision-
making to the knowledge base about teach-
ing and learning. They also indicated aware-
ness on the part of these leaders that the
existing organizational structures could not
make this link, and that new mechanisms
and new relationships were needed in order
to make a shift to evidence-based practice. 
Local Designs
During this period, each of the three dis-
tricts designed their own reform initiatives
that were intended to be widely, if not uni-
versally, adopted by their schools. Decisions
about these local initiatives fell outside the
scope of the new structures created to review
evidence about best practice. However, the
districts recognized that they were engaged
in development work and that their new ini-
tiatives would have to be piloted and evalu-
ated. They attempted to draw upon current
knowledge and effective programs being
used in other settings in designing their ini-
tiatives, but their use of research evidence in
these instances was uneven. The champions
of specific reforms typically examined litera-
ture selectively and found theories and “evi-
dence” to justify their approaches or recruit-
ed “experts” who were advocates of their
preferred strategies. Distinctions among
empirical research, theories, and simple
advocacy were not always clear or under-
stood and for the reasons cited earlier,
research evidence had limited influence on
these local design processes. 
Yet, the efforts to apply research to the
design of new initiatives also revealed the
seriousness of the local commitment to evi-
dence-based practice. To ratchet up perfor-
mance in its lowest performing schools, one
district developed a new elementary school
design that drew on elements of several
nationally available programs. Another dis-
trict drew on experience in industry to
redesign its school organization and develop
an innovative team approach to teaching.
The third district had earlier piloted a strate-
gy for breaking up its large comprehensive
high schools into small learning communities
and moved to implement the strategy dis-
trict-wide.
All three of these local initiatives were
evaluated by external groups. The districts
made significant investments in these evalu-
ations, and all three used the results to make
revisions in their designs. In two cases, the
evaluations affected decisions about continu-
ing or expanding the investments in these
programs. District staff seemed to be more
insistent that there be evidence of effective-
ness for locally designed programs than they
were about externally developed ones. This
difference in attitude toward locally and
externally developed programs may be relat-
ed to the fact that the latter often brought
external funds, and carried the weight of
their national reputations. It might also be
due to the greater entanglement of local ini-
tiatives in the internal politics of the systems
and their association with specific actors or
offices within the systems.  
Central Office Versus School Staff
Central office staff showed a greater com-
mitment to the use of evidence than did
school staff. District staff generally felt that
decisions ought to be based on a solid ratio-
nale supported by research or at least consis-
tent with it. However, they were often frus-
trated by the lack of research on key issues
with which they were struggling, such as the
effectiveness of middle schools, high school
literacy programs, and coaching strategies. In
addition, the existing research they did find
was often contradictory and confusing and it
was hard to assess the claims made by vari-
ous reform developers. School staff talked
about using research, but in fact relied most
heavily on the opinions of their peers. They
found research hard to access and even hard-
er to interpret and struggled to sort out sig-
nificant findings from other knowledge
claims. 
Decentralization of decision-making com-
bined with weak district guidance appeared
to be undermining the use of knowledge
rather than promoting it. Selection of whole-
school reforms by school staffs was often
based more on personal testimonials, philo-
sophical comfort, ease of use, lack of threat to
current practice, and good marketing by
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Teachers indicated that research was less use-
ful for determining if a design was producing
results than their sense of whether the design
fit their own notions of good practice. Teach-
ers preferred designs that drew on research
about practices that they already felt were
“good” than they were in choosing designs
that were producing results.
Impact of Time on Decisions
The pressure from local and state account-
ability systems, from civic leaders, and from
parents to do “something” to raise student
scores expeditiously had an enormous
impact on how the districts proceeded. Dis-
trict staff understood the magnitude of their
responsibility and felt the pressure to act
quickly and to produce results. Leaders in all
three districts felt that they had limited time,
maybe two to three years, to produce gains in
student performance. They hoped that
increased performance pressure and more
professional development for teachers would
lead to changes in instruction and curriculum
that would improve test scores in the short
run and buy time for school designs and local
initiatives to spread and have some effect.
They were forced to allocate scarce resources
to “short-run” strategies in order to buy time
for the implementation and rollout of the
deeper reforms that they were advocating.
This made it hard to maintain focus. In
two cases, this strategy failed; district-wide
test scores remained relatively flat. Gains in
the schools implementing the local reform
initiatives were not able to overcome the pub-
lic perception that little progress was being
made. In the third case, modest district-wide
achievement gains stalled after several years
and district-led reforms were undermined by
weak implementation and resistance in the
schools. In all three cases, the superinten-
dents who had led the design of the local
reform initiatives left under pressure from
their boards and local political leaders who
were growing impatient. In two cases, they
were pushed out in spite of demonstrated
growth in student achievement in the sites
implementing reforms and new leadership
transitions brought new agendas that dis-
tracted attention away from the current
reforms. 
Decision Two: How to Get the
Job Done?
Professional Development
Leaders in all three districts believed that
high-quality, stable professional develop-
ment for teachers was essential to the effec-
tive implementation of their reform, and they
believed that professional development
should be research-based. Each district creat-
ed new structures for this purpose. 
One district created a quasi-independent
academy that offered short, one- or two-day
courses for teachers that were not subject-
based, but focused instead on generic teach-
ing competencies. These courses were based
on research on instruction, but there was lit-
tle attention to how curriculum content influ-
ences teaching and learning. These courses
were popular with teachers and were seen as
particularly useful by new teachers. The
academy also provided training in support of
the district reform initiative, but not for the
comprehensive school reform designs. The
latter task was left to the reform developers.
There was no follow-up support for the train-
ing offered by the academy and observations
in the schools suggested that it had limited
impact on practice. The independent status of
the academy made it harder for the district to
redirect professional development to support
reform initiatives and to improve its impact
on instruction.
A second district had a staff of trainers
who annually created a broad menu of work-
shops and courses in cooperation with
schools and local universities. Some of the
offerings related to the district reforms, espe-
cially standards-based instruction in various
disciplines, but others covered a wide variety
of topics. While many of the workshops were
described as research-based, there was no
procedure for determining whether these
claims were accurate. Professional develop-
ment was largely determined by the prefer-
ences of individual teachers, and there was
no follow-up to support changes in practice.
The district attempted to create a new model
in which one school campus would serve as a
demonstration site for new strategies and
would work with networks of schools to test
and diffuse these practices. The burden of
running a large campus overwhelmed the
CPRE Policy Briefs
5The Use of Research Evidence in Instructional Improvement
vision of research and development and the
strategy never took hold. The central office
was unwilling or unable to focus its profes-
sional development investments in support
of its reforms. The culture of responding to
teacher interests proved resilient.
The third district developed a large net-
work of full-time professional development
specialists to run workshops and coach
teachers in support of the district reforms.
Although intended to be a resource to the
schools and responsive to their needs, they
were more often assigned to support district
reform initiatives. Much of their time was
spent providing informational workshops for
teachers. When they were able to work
directly with teachers, they seemed to have a
positive impact on practice. They had little
connection to the comprehensive school
reform design teams working in the schools.
This district belatedly recognized that this
network of trainers could not provide teach-
ers with the knowledge and skills they need-
ed to develop new curricula based on the
newly adopted standards. Two years after the
standards were adopted, the district began to
offer curriculum summer institutes for teach-
ers. Enrollment in summer programs grew
rapidly and they were perceived by teachers
as highly effective. However, follow-up sup-
port was uneven and the relationship
between the institutes and the professional
development network was weak.
The norms that shaped professional
development in these districts proved hard to
change. All three districts created profession-
al development infrastructures that proved
hard to control and to focus. They relied
heavily on “trainers” who could design and
deliver professional development and were
not successful in moving this work into the
schools. They had difficulty in developing
strategies that addressed curriculum content.
All three left fundamental decisions about
the focus of professional development to
individual teachers and, to a lesser degree, to
schools. The result in all three cases was a
highly fragmented system of professional
development that failed to establish powerful
connections to classroom practice.
Use of Evidence
Research evidence had little to do with
the professional development offerings in
any of the districts. The professional devel-
opment staff were not members of an evi-
dence-based culture themselves and they
were seldom asked by district leadership if
participation in the programs led to changes
in practice or increases in student perfor-
mance. There was no monitoring of the
effects of professional development activities
in any of the districts and no information
gathered from teachers about any impact on
their teaching practice. Evaluation was limit-
ed to satisfaction surveys. Since professional
development staff felt they would be judged
on how well they were liked, they often
offered hot topics of the day in hopes of
drawing and pleasing more teachers. Also,
while the professional development staff
were skilled as trainers and in group man-
agement, they had little expertise in substan-
tive areas and were usually not linked to the
research community. Professional develop-
ment was driven by self-defined needs and
by interest, and not by evidence of effective-
ness. 
Effectiveness
There were several reasons why districts
had trouble offering effective professional
development. One was that the districts
themselves were not focused and were sup-
porting many initiatives at the same time and
they expected professional development staff
to support them all. Too often, professional
development time was used to transfer cen-
tral office information and not focused on
substantive issues. The professional develop-
ment cultures themselves were not evidence-
based and were instead committed to meet-
ing the wants, needs, and desires of teachers,
or pursuing the interests of the trainers. This
latter point is important. The reliance on pro-
fessional trainers meant that there were jobs
to be protected. The trainers had a vested
interest in offering the kinds of professional
development experiences that they knew
how to design and deliver. This culture was
entrenched and hard to change. And finally,
most professional development decisions
were being made at levels below the central
office.
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sional development activities most often
neglected the content knowledge of teachers.
Programs tended to emphasize process and
procedure over subject-matter knowledge.
The staff responsible for this enormous task
were linked to different reform networks and
valued different approaches to improvement.
The result was a potpourri of workshops and
events rather than a coherent program of pro-
fessional development. 
Decision Three: How to Scale
Up?
All three districts made attempts to take
reforms to scale. Two of the districts relied
heavily on incentives to persuade schools to
adopt reforms, and the third used mandates.
However, little thought was given to how
teachers viewed the new reform programs,
how to persuade any reluctant staff to adopt
new practices, or how to help them succeed.
Many central office staff believed that accep-
tance and expansion of reforms would hap-
pen by itself, spurred on by the pressure to
improve performance that the high-stakes
accountability environment would bring to
bear. The pressure would lead to the adop-
tion of “proven” practices and, over time,
school staff would make better adoption
decisions.
In fact, there is some evidence to support
this belief.  Literacy programs spread rapidly
across two of the districts because two
schools that adopted the programs early
showed higher gains on reading tests than
other schools. But, there is contrary evidence
as well. In one district, a locally designed ele-
mentary program proved highly successful
in a set of low-performing schools, but it was
not adopted by other schools in spite of the
central office’s effort to provide incentives for
its adoption. Inquiry suggested that it was
seen as a “remedial” strategy for low-income,
at-risk students and its adoption would be
viewed by teachers and parents as an admis-
sion of failure by school leaders. Schools
often continued to participate in some
designs even after several years with little or
no gains. Also, district accountability systems
placed a premium on obtaining quick effects
and reforms require several years to achieve
any significant change in classroom practice.
The common tendencies of the districts
were to either offer opportunities to schools
or to mandate reforms and provide the nec-
essary training. Concerns about implementa-
tion barriers, important incentives or disin-
centives, and legitimate alternatives were not
seriously discussed or considered. Using evi-
dence in the decision to expand was not com-
mon. In fact, decisions to expand a program
often ran ahead of the collection and review
of evidence. Again, time pressure proved
more powerful than the desire to base deci-
sions on evidence. 
There were several external forces that
made scaling up difficult for districts — the
noisy reform environment, changes in state
policies, and turnover in leadership. Focus-
ing investments, persisting to get full imple-
mentation across a district, and making
investment and continuation decisions in the
face of changes in central office leadership
was almost impossible. The leadership
turnover at the middle level was also signifi-
cant and critical because so often it is the staff
at this level that reviews the evidence and
advocates for specific programs. District
leaders wanted to use evidence as they made
decisions about whether to scale up their
reform. But this was in conflict with their
need to appear knowledgeable and confident
about their vision and strategy in the eyes of
their board and the public. And when they
did support evaluations and feedback, it
came too late. They couldn’t wait for years to
decide next steps and so they made decisions
to replicate the reform lacking the solid evi-
dence most really wanted. Scaling up hap-
pened more by default than by plan and was
seldom based on evidence of a program’s
success. 
Conclusion
The fact that central office personnel in
the three districts were seeking research find-
ings represents an important step toward evi-
dence-based decision-making. Leaders in all
three districts said that they wanted staff to
base their decisions on evidence whenever
possible. They also wanted to support and
expand programs that produced results. In
all three districts, there were serious efforts to
build evidence-based cultures in the central
offices and to encourage schools to pay
greater attention to research evidence. How-
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7ever, these efforts were seriously hampered
by the limited research evidence easily avail-
able to decision-makers and by problems
faced by staff trying to access and make sense
of the research they could find. Conflicting
research findings, small sample sizes, and a
lack of attention to key issues facing districts
all contributed to the confusion. Districts
were also hampered by the inability of dis-
trict and school staff to put aside old patterns
of decision-making that focused on philoso-
phy or the “goodness” of an option, rather
than evidence of its effectiveness.   
Nevertheless, some progress was made as
central office staff gave more consideration to
research evidence in their decision-making.
There was much less progress, however, in
shifting the mindsets of school staff or in per-
suading professional development staff to
use evidence, not interest, as the primary cri-
terion for development programs for teach-
ers. The leaders in the three districts agreed
that most investment decisions were not
being made on the evidence and viewed this
as a significant weakness, but they also felt
that correcting it would require major cultur-
al changes in their organizations.
Finally, while many current attempts to
improve the use of evidence focus on the sup-
ply side of the equation (that is, on improving
the quality and definitiveness of education
research), this study shows the importance of
the demand side as well. Quite simply, users
must be educated to appreciate the value and
contributions of research.
Next Steps
What can be done to help district leaders
and school staffs move in the direction of evi-
dence-based practice? Part of the answer lies
in making changes in the priorities and
approaches of the research community. More
collaboration is needed between researchers
and practitioners in setting research agendas.
Research products need to be more accessible
and rigorous. Likewise, districts must
demand high-quality research that is based
on well-designed and reviewed studies.
Increased demand for useful and usable
research products will influence what
researchers do, but this will happen more
quickly if funding agencies take on the task
of focusing research on the core problems of
practice. All parties must work to actively
reduce the noisiness of education research
that now makes it so hard for local decision-
makers to make sense of the message. Feder-
al agencies need to support periodic meta-
analyses in critical areas in order to make the
knowledge base accessible to local decision-
makers. 
But changes in the research community
must be paralleled with changes in the cul-
ture of school districts. The careerism and
political climates that result in constant
changes in leadership and in reform agendas
are also major parts of the problem. The work
of improving teaching and learning is serious
work, and it needs to be treated as such. It is
work that takes time and significant invest-
ments. It may be impossible to bring about
more stable leadership, but it should be pos-
sible to stabilize state and local reform agen-
das. State policymakers, business leaders,
civic leaders in districts, and board members
need to be educated about the high cost of
making constant changes in direction and of
layering reforms over one another. 
Furthermore, districts are well positioned
to carry out large clinical studies themselves.
Large districts could test new curriculum or
instructional strategies. They could engage
large numbers of teachers in clinical trials of
specific instructional techniques. They
should not be waiting for the academic
research community to meet their needs, but
should form partnerships with local research
institutions and seek funding for research
that will meet their needs. The key point is
that they should lead this work, not be sub-
missive partners in research directed by
researchers whose interests may not match
their own. 
Finally, it is important not to oversell the
importance of research findings or underesti-
mate the value of local “clinical” knowledge.
The evidence-based practice movement in
medicine values both scientific research and
clinical expertise. Good treatment rests on
both sources of knowledge. This approach
should be followed in education. Research
findings can suggest policy options or com-
ponents of a local response to a problem, but
determining what will work best in a partic-
ular district requires the knowledge of its
existing commitments, its history, its
resources, and its political climate. Increased
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attention to research findings and the clinical expertise of accom-
plished practitioners will lead to better decisions and to a strong
knowledge base, but they are only part of what must be considered
by policymakers committed to evidence-based policymaking.
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